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POL ANTR` AS
Roughly one-third of world trade is intraﬁrm trade. This paper starts by
unveiling two systematic patterns in the volume of intraﬁrm trade. In a panel of
industries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S. imports is signiﬁcantly
higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting industry. In a cross
section of countries the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S. imports is
signiﬁcantly higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country. I
then show that these patterns can be rationalized in a theoretical framework that
combines a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the ﬁrm with a Helpman-Krugman
view of international trade. In particular, I develop an incomplete-contracting,
property-rights model of the boundaries of the ﬁrm, which I then incorporate into
a standard trade model with imperfect competition and product differentiation.
The model pins down the boundaries of multinational ﬁrms as well as the inter-
national location of production, and it is shown to predict the patterns of intraﬁrm
trade identiﬁed above. Econometric evidence reveals that the model is consistent
with other qualitative and quantitative features of the data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly one-third of world trade is intraﬁrm trade. In 1994,
42.7 percent of the total volume of U. S. imports of goods took
place within the boundaries of multinational ﬁrms, with the
share being 36.3 percent for U. S. exports of goods [Zeile 1997].
Not only is intraﬁrm trade a large fraction of world trade, but it
also shows some distinctive patterns. Relative to the total volume
of trade, intraﬁrm trade (i) is heavily concentrated in capital-
intensive industries and (ii) ﬂows mostly between capital-abun-
dant countries. Figure I provides a striking illustration of the ﬁrst
fact. In a cross section of 23 manufacturing industries, the share
of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S. imports is signiﬁcantly higher,
the higher the capital intensity of the exporting industry. Firms
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1375in the United States tend to import capital-intensive goods, such
as chemical products, within the boundaries of their ﬁrms, while
they tend to import labor-intensive goods, such as textile prod-
ucts, from unafﬁliated parties. Figure II unveils a second strong
pattern in the share of intraﬁrm imports. In a cross section of 28
countries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S. imports is
signiﬁcantly higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio of the ex-
porting country. U. S. imports from capital-abundant countries,
such as Switzerland, tend to take place between afﬁliated units of
multinational ﬁrms, while U. S. imports from capital-scarce coun-
tries, such as Egypt, occur mostly at arm’s length. This second
fact indicates that the well-known predominance of North-North
trade in total world trade is even more pronounced within the
intraﬁrm component of trade.
1
1. This is consistent with comparisons based on foreign direct investment
(FDI) data. In the year 2000 more than 85 percent of FDI ﬂows occurred between
developed countries [UNCTAD 2001], while the share of North-North trade in
total world trade was roughly 70 percent [World Trade Organization 2001].
FIGURE I
Share of Intraﬁrm U. S. Imports and Relative Factor Intensities
The Y-axis corresponds to the logarithm of the share of intraﬁrm imports in
total U. S. imports for 23 manufacturing industries averaged over four years:
1987, 1989, 1992, 1994. The X-axis measures the average log of that industry’s
ratio of capital stock to total employment, using U. S. data. See Appendix 4 for
industry codes and Appendix 3 for data sources.
1376 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSWhy are capital-intensive goods transacted within the
boundaries of multinational ﬁrms, while labor-intensive goods
are traded at arm’s length?
2 Indeed, in a hypothetical world in
which ﬁrm boundaries had no bearing on the pattern of interna-
tional trade, one would expect only random differences between
the behavior of the volume of intraﬁrm trade and that of the total
volume of trade. In particular, the share of intraﬁrm trade in total
trade would not be expected to correlate signiﬁcantly with any of
the classical determinants of international trade, including capi-
tal intensity. To answer this question, I build on the theory of the
ﬁrm initially exposited in Coase [1937] and later developed by
Williamson [1985] and Grossman and Hart [1986], by which
activities take place wherever transaction costs are minimized. In
particular, I develop a property-rights model of the boundaries of
the ﬁrm in which, in equilibrium, transaction costs of using the
2. At this point, a natural question is whether capital intensity and capital
abundance are truly the crucial factors behind the correlations in Figures I and II.
Section IV will present econometric evidence indicating that these patterns are
not driven by omitted factors.
FIGURE II
Share of Intraﬁrm U. S. Imports and Relative Factor Endowments
The Y-axis corresponds to the logarithm of the share of intraﬁrm imports in
total U. S. imports for 28 exporting countries in 1992. The X-axis measures the log
of the exporting country’s physical capital stock divided by its total number of
workers. See Appendix 5 for country codes and Appendix 3 for details on data
sources.
1377 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREmarket are increasing in the capital intensity of the imported
good. To explain the cross-country pattern in Figure II, I then
embed this partial-equilibrium framework in a general-equilib-
rium, factor-proportions model of international trade, with im-
perfect competition and product differentiation, along the lines of
Helpman and Krugman [1985]. Capital-intensive goods are
transacted within ﬁrm boundaries, while labor-intensive goods
are traded at arm’s length. The model pins down the boundaries
of multinational ﬁrms as well as the international location of
production. Bilateral trade ﬂows between any two countries are
uniquely determined, with capital-abundant countries capturing
relatively large shares of a country’s imports of capital-intensive
goods. The interaction of transaction-cost minimization and com-
parative advantage is shown to naturally give rise to the rela-
tionship between intraﬁrm trade and relative factor endowments
in Figure II.
3
In drawing ﬁrm boundaries, I build on the seminal work of
Grossman and Hart [1986]. I consider a world of incomplete
contracts in which ﬁnal-good producers need to obtain specialized
intermediate inputs from their suppliers. Production of these
intermediate inputs requires a combination of noncontractible
and relationship-speciﬁc investments in capital and labor. Fol-
lowing the property-rights approach of Grossman and Hart, own-
ership of their suppliers entitles ﬁnal-good producers to some
residual rights of control, thus improving their ex post bargaining
position, but reducing the suppliers’ ex ante incentives to make
relationship-speciﬁc investments. When all investments in pro-
duction are incurred by suppliers, efﬁciency dictates that ﬁnal-
good producers always give up these residual rights of control and
engage in arm’s length transactions.
To explain the higher propensity to integrate in capital-
intensive industries, I extend the framework of Grossman and
Hart [1986] by allowing the transferability of capital investment
decisions. In particular, I show that in situations in which the
bargaining power of suppliers is low, giving up these residual
rights of control may not sufﬁce to induce suppliers to undertake
adequate levels of investment. In such situations, ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers will ﬁnd it optimal to alleviate the holdup problem faced
3. This second part of the argument is based on the premise that capital-
abundant countries tend to export mostly capital-intensive commodities. Romalis
[2002] has recently shown that the empirical evidence is indeed consistent with
factor proportions being a key determinant of the structure of international trade.
1378 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSby suppliers by contributing to their relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments in capital. Investment-sharing reduces the holdup faced by
suppliers, but naturally increases the exposure of ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers to opportunistic behavior, with the exposure being an
increasing function of the contribution to investment costs. If
capital cost sharing is large enough, as it will naturally be the
case in capital-intensive processes, ex ante efﬁciency is shown to
command that residual rights of control, and thus ownership, be
assigned to the ﬁnal-good producer, thus giving rise to vertical
integration. In general, the attractiveness of vertical integration
is shown to be increasing in the capital intensity of intermediate
input production.
4
The argument is based on the premise that investments
related to the labor input are harder to share than investments in
physical capital. This may be the result of suppliers having su-
perior local knowledge in hiring workers, or it may be explained
by the fact that managing workers requires a physical presence in
the production plant. Business practices indeed suggest that cost
sharing is more prevalent in capital investments. Dunning [1993,
pp. 455–456] describes several cost-sharing practices of multina-
tional ﬁrms in their relations with independent subcontractors.
Among others, these include provision of used machinery and
specialized tools and equipment, preﬁnancing of machinery and
tools, and procurement assistance in obtaining capital equip-
ment. There is no reference to cost sharing in labor costs, other
than in labor training. Milgrom and Roberts [1993] discuss the
particular example of General Motors, which pays for ﬁrm- and
product-speciﬁc capital equipment needed by their suppliers,
even when this equipment is located in the suppliers’ facilities.
Similarly, in his review article on Japanese ﬁrms, Aoki [1990, p.
25] describes the close connections between manufacturers and
their suppliers but writes that “suppliers have considerable au-
tonomy in other respects, for example in personnel administra-
tion.” Even within ﬁrm boundaries, cost sharing seems to mostly
take place when capital investments are involved. In particular,
Table I indicates that British afﬁliates of U. S.-based multina-
4. Although in this paper I show that a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the
ﬁrm is consistent with the facts in Figures I and II, neither my theoretical model
nor the available empirical evidence is rich enough to test this view of the ﬁrm
against alternative ones. This would be a major undertaking on its own. See Baker
and Hubbard [2002] and Whinston [2002] for more formal treatments of these
issues.
1379 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREtionals tend to have much more independence in their employ-
ment decisions (e.g., in hiring of workers) than in their ﬁnancial
decisions (e.g., in their choice of capital investment projects).
This paper is related to previous theoretical studies of the
multinational ﬁrm in general-equilibrium models of international
trade. This literature has developed models rationalizing the
emergence of multinational ﬁrms in the presence of international
factor-price differentials (e.g., Helpman [1984]), whenever trans-
port costs are high, and whenever ﬁrm-speciﬁc economies of scale
are high relative to plant-speciﬁc economies of scale (e.g.,
Markusen [1984] and Brainard [1997]). These different ap-
proaches to the multinational ﬁrm share a common failure to
properly model the crucial issue of internalization. These models
can explain why a domestic ﬁrm might have an incentive to
undertake part of its production process abroad, but they fail to
explain why this foreign production will occur within ﬁrm bound-
aries rather than through arm’s length subcontracting or licens-
ing. In the same way that a theory of the ﬁrm based purely on
technological considerations does not constitute a satisfactory
theory of the ﬁrm (cf. Tirole [1988] and Hart [1995]), a theory of
the multinational ﬁrm based solely on economies of scale and
transport costs cannot be satisfactory either. As described above,
I will instead set forth a purely organizational, property-rights
model of the multinational ﬁrm. My model will make no distinc-
tion between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and plant-speciﬁc economies of scale.
Furthermore, trade will be costless, and factor prices will not
differ across countries. Yet multinationals will emerge in equilib-
TABLE I
DECISION-MAKING IN U. S. BASED MULTINATIONALS
% of British afﬁliates in which parent inﬂuence on decision is strong or decisive
Financial decisions Employment/personnel decisions
Setting of ﬁnancial targets 51 Union recognition 4
Preparation of yearly budget 20 Collective bargaining 1
Acquisition of funds for working capital 44 Wage increases 8
Choice of capital investment projects 33 Numbers employed 13
Financing of investment projects 46 Layoffs/redundancies 10
Target rate of return on investment 68 Hiring of workers 10
Sale of ﬁxed assets 30 Recruitment of executives 16
Dividend policy 82 Recruitment of senior
Royalty payments to parent company 82 managers 13
Source. Dunning [1993, p. 227]. Originally from Young, Hood, and Hamill [1985].
1380 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSrium, and their implied intraﬁrm trade ﬂows will match the
strong patterns identiﬁed above.
5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the closed-economy version of the model and studies the
role of factor intensity in determining the equilibrium mode of
organization. Section III describes the multicountry version of the
model and discusses the international location of production as
well as the implied patterns of intraﬁrm trade. Section IV pre-
sents econometric evidence supporting the view that both capital
intensity and capital abundance are signiﬁcant factors in explain-
ing the volume of U. S. intraﬁrm imports. Section V concludes.
The proofs of the main results are relegated to Appendixes 1 and 2.
II. THE CLOSED-ECONOMY MODEL:O WNERSHIP
AND CAPITAL INTENSITY
This section develops an incomplete-contracting, property-
rights model of the boundaries of the ﬁrm that rationalizes a
higher motive of integration in capital-intensive sectors.
II.A. Setup
Consider a closed economy that employs two factors of pro-
duction, capital and labor, to produce a continuum of varieties in
two sectors, Y and Z. Capital and labor are inelastically supplied
and freely mobile across sectors. The economy is inhabited by a
unit measure of identical consumers who view the varieties in
each industry as differentiated. In particular, letting y(i) and z(i)
be consumption of variety i in sectors Y and Z, preferences of the
representative consumer are of the form,
(1) U 
0
nY
yi
 di
/
0
nZ
zi
 di
1/
,
5. This paper is also related to previous attempts to model the internalization
decision of multinational ﬁrms. Following the insights from the seminal work of
Casson [1979], Rugman [1981], and others, this literature has constructed models
studying the role of informational asymmetries and knowledge nonexcludability
in determining the choice between direct investment and licensing (e.g., Ethier
[1986] and Ethier and Markusen [1996]). This paper differs from this literature in
stressing the importance of capital intensity and the allocation of residual rights
in the internalization decision, and perhaps more importantly, in describing and
testing the implications of such a decision for the pattern of intraﬁrm trade. My
theoretical framework also shares some features with recent contributions to an
emerging literature on general-equilibrium models of industry structure (e.g.,
McLaren [2000] and Grossman and Helpman [2002a, 2002b]).
1381 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREwhere nY (nZ) is the endogenously determined measure of vari-
eties in industry Y (Z). Consumers allocate a constant share  
(0,1) of their spending in sector Y and a share 1 in sector Z.
The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in a given
sector, 1/(1  ), is assumed to be greater than one.
Goods are also differentiated in the eyes of producers. In
particular, each variety y(i) requires a special and distinct inter-
mediate input which I denote by xY(i). Similarly, each variety z(i)
requires a distinct component xZ(i). The specialized intermediate
input must be of high quality, otherwise the output of the ﬁnal
good is zero. If the input is of high quality, production of the ﬁnal
good requires no further costs, and y(i)  xY(i), z(i)  xZ(i).
Production of a high-quality intermediate input requires
capital and labor. For simplicity, technology is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas:
(2) xki 
Kx,ki
k 
k
Lx,ki
1  k
1k
, k  Y,Z	,
where Kx,k(i) and Lx,k(i) denote the amount of capital and labor
employed in production of variety i in industry k  {Y,Z}. I
assume that industry Y is more capital-intensive than industry
Z; i.e., 1  Y 
 Z  0. Low-quality intermediate inputs can be
produced at a negligible cost in both sectors.
There are also ﬁxed costs associated with the production of
an intermediate input. To simplify matters, it is assumed that
ﬁxed costs in each industry have the same factor intensity as
variable costs, so that the total cost functions are homothetic. In
particular, ﬁxed costs for each variety in industry k  {Y,Z} are
fr
kw
1k, where r is the rental rate of capital and w the wage
rate.
There are two types of producers: ﬁnal-good producers and
suppliers of intermediate inputs. Before any investment is made,
a ﬁnal-good producer decides whether it wants to enter a given
market, and if so, whether to obtain the component from a ver-
tically integrated supplier or from a stand-alone supplier. An
integrated supplier is just a division of the ﬁnal-good producer
and thus has no control rights over the amount of input produced.
Figuratively, at any point in time the parent ﬁrm could selec-
tively ﬁre the manager of the supplying division and seize pro-
duction. Conversely, a stand-alone supplier does indeed have
these residual rights of control. In Hart and Moore’s [1990] words,
in such a case the ﬁnal-good producer could only “ﬁre” the entire
1382 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSsupplying ﬁrm, including its production. Integrated and noninte-
grated suppliers differ only in the residual rights they are enti-
tled to, and in particular both have access to the same technology
as speciﬁed in equation (2).
6
As discussed in the Introduction, a premise of this paper is
that investments in physical capital are easier to share than
investments in labor input. To capture this idea, I assume that
while the labor input is necessarily provided by the supplier,
capital expenditures rKx,k(i) are instead transferable, in the
sense that the ﬁnal-good producer can decide whether to let the
supplier incur this factor cost too, or rather rent the capital itself
and hand it to the supplier at no charge.
7 Irrespective of who
bears their cost, the investments in capital and labor are chosen
simultaneously and noncooperatively.
8 Once a ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer and its supplier enter the market, they are locked into the
relationship: the investments rKx,k(i) and wLx,k(i) are incurred
upon entry and are useless outside the relationship. In William-
son’s [1985] words, the initially competitive environment is fun-
damentally transformed into one of bilateral monopoly. Regard-
less of ﬁrm structure and the choice of cost sharing, ﬁxed costs
associated with production of the component are divided as fol-
lows: fFr
kw
1k for the ﬁnal-good producer and fSr
kw
1k for
the supplier, with fF  fS  f.
9
Free entry into each sector ensures zero expected proﬁts for
a potential entrant. To simplify the description of the industry
equilibrium, I assume that upon entry the supplier makes a
lump-sum transfer Tk(i) to the ﬁnal-good producer, which can
vary by industry and variety. Ex ante, there are a large number
of identical, potential suppliers for each variety in each industry,
so that competition among these suppliers will make Tk(i) adjust
so as to make them break even. The ﬁnal-good producer chooses
6. This is in contrast with the transaction-cost literature that usually as-
sumes that integration leads to an exogenous increase in variable costs (e.g.,
Williamson [1985] and Grossman and Helpman [2002a]).
7. Alternatively, one could assume that labor costs are also transferable, but
that their transfer leads to a signiﬁcant fall in productivity. This fall in produc-
tivity could be explained, in an international context, by the inability of multina-
tional ﬁrms to cope with idiosyncratic labor markets (cf., Caves [1996, p. 123]).
8. The assumption that the ﬁnal-good producer decides between bearing all
or none of the capital expenditures can be relaxed to a case of partial transfer-
ability (see Antra `s [2003]).
9. Henceforth, I associate a subscript F with the ﬁnal-good producer and a
subscript S with the supplier.
1383 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREthe mode of organization so as to maximize its ex ante proﬁts,
which include the transfer.
The setting is one of incomplete contracts. It is assumed that
an outside party cannot distinguish between a high-quality and a
low-quality intermediate input. Hence, input suppliers and ﬁnal-
good producers cannot sign enforceable contracts specifying the
purchase of a certain type of intermediate input for a certain
price. If they did, input suppliers would have an incentive to
produce a low-quality input at the lower cost and still cash the
same revenues. I take the existence of contract incompleteness as
a fact of life, and will not complicate the model to relax the
informational assumptions needed for this incompleteness to ex-
ist.
10 It is equally assumed that no outside party can verify the
amount of ex ante investments rKx,k(i) and wLx,k(i). If these
were veriﬁable, then ﬁnal-good producers and suppliers could
contract on them, and the cost-reducing beneﬁt of producing a
low-quality input would disappear. For the same reason, it is
assumed that the parties cannot write contracts contingent on
sale revenues. Following Grossman and Hart [1986], the only
contractibles ex ante are the allocation of residual rights and the
ex ante transfer Tk(i).
11
If the supplier incurs all variable costs, the contract incom-
pleteness gives rise to a standard holdup problem. The ﬁnal-good
producer will want to renegotiate the price after xk(i) has been
produced, since at this point the intermediate input is useless
outside the relationship. Foreseeing this renegotiation, the sup-
plier will undertake suboptimal investments in both capital and
labor. If the ﬁnal-good producer shares capital expenditures with
the supplier, the holdup problem becomes two-sided. Because the
investment in capital is also speciﬁc to the pair, the ﬁnal-good
10. From the work of Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994], No ¨ldeke and
Schmidt [1995], and others, it is well-known that allowing for speciﬁc-perfor-
mance contracts can lead, under certain circumstances, to efﬁcient ex ante rela-
tionship-speciﬁc investments. Che and Hausch [1997] have shown, however, that
when ex ante investments are cooperative (in the sense, that one party’s invest-
ment beneﬁts the other party), speciﬁc-performance contracts may not lead to
ﬁrst-best investment levels and may actually have no value.
11. The assumption of noncontractibility of ex ante investments could be
relaxed to a case of partial contractibility. I have investigated an extension of the
model in which production requires both contractible and noncontractible invest-
ments. If the marginal cost of noncontractible investments is increasing in the
amount of contractible investments, the ability to set the contractible investments
in the ex ante contract is not sufﬁcient to solve the underinvestment problem
discussed below, and the model delivers results analogous to the ones discussed in
the main text.
1384 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSproducer is equally locked in the relationship, and its investment
in capital will also tend to be suboptimal. In either case, the
extent of the underinvestment by each party will be inversely
related to the share of surplus they obtain in the bargaining. As
is standard in the literature, I model the ex post bargaining as a
Generalized Nash Bargaining, which leaves the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer with a fraction   (0,1) of the ex post gains from trade.
As discussed in the Introduction, cost sharing will emerge in
equilibrium whenever the bargaining power of suppliers is low. I
hereafter assume the following.
ASSUMPTION 1. 
1⁄2 .
Following the work of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart
and Moore [1990], and contrary to the older transaction-cost
literature, integration of the supplier does not eliminate the op-
portunistic behavior at the heart of the holdup problem. Bargain-
ing will therefore occur even when the ﬁnal-good producer and
the supplier are integrated. The ex post distribution of surplus
will, however, be sensitive to ownership structure. When the
supplier is a stand-alone ﬁrm, the amount xk(i) is owned by the
supplier, and thus if the two parties fail to agree on a division of
the surplus, the ﬁnal-good producer is left with nothing. Con-
versely, under integration, the manager of the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer can always ﬁre the manager of the supplying division and
seize the amount of input already produced. The outside option
for the ﬁnal-good producer will therefore be higher under inte-
gration than under outsourcing. If the ﬁnal-good producer could
fully appropriate xk(i) under integration, there would be no sur-
plus to bargain over after production, and the supplier would
optimally set Lx,k(i)  0 (which of course would imply that
xk(i)  0). In that case, integration would never be chosen. To
make things more interesting, I assume that by integrating the
supplier, the ﬁnal-good producer obtains the residual rights over
only a fraction   (0,1) of the amount of xk(i) produced, so that
the surplus of the relationship remains positive even under inte-
gration.
12 On the other hand, and because the component is
completely speciﬁct ot h eﬁnal-good producer, the outside option
for the intermediate input producer is zero regardless of owner-
ship structure.
12. I take the fact that  is strictly less than one as given, but this assumption
could be rationalized in a richer framework (see Antra `s [2003] for a rationale).
1385 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREFigure III summarizes the timing of events. At t0, the ﬁnal-
good producer decides whether it wants to enter a given market,
residual rights are assigned, the extent of cost sharing is decided,
and the supplier makes a lump-sum transfer to the ﬁnal-good
producer. At t1, ﬁrms choose their investments in capital and
labor and also incur their ﬁxed costs. At t2, the ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer hands the speciﬁcations of the component (and perhaps the
capital stock Kx,k) to its partner, and this latter produces the
intermediate input, which can be of high or low quality. At t3, the
quality of the component becomes observable, and the two parties
bargain over the division of the surplus. Finally, at t4, the ﬁnal
good is produced and sold. For simplicity, I assume that agents do
not discount the future between t0 and t4.
II.B. Firm Behavior
The model is solved by starting at t4 and moving backwards.
I will assume throughout the main text that ﬁnal-good producers
always choose to engage in capital cost sharing and thus incur the
variable costs rKx,k(i). In Appendix 1, I formally show that As-
sumption 1 is in fact sufﬁcient to ensure that this is the case in
equilibrium.
The unit elasticity of substitution between varieties in indus-
tries Y and Z implies that we can analyze ﬁrm behavior in each
industry independently. Consider industry Y, and suppose that
at t4, nY,V pairs of integrated ﬁrms and nY,O pairs of stand-alone
ﬁrms are producing.
13 Let pY,V(i) be the price charged for variety
i by an integrating ﬁnal-good producer, and let pY,O(i) be the
13. Henceforth, a subscript V will be associated with ﬁnal-good producers
that vertically integrate their suppliers. A subscript O will be used for those that
outsource the production of the input.
FIGURE III
Timing of Events
1386 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScorresponding price charged by a nonintegrating ﬁnal-good pro-
ducer. From equation (1), demand for any variety i in industry Y
is given by
(3) yi  AYpYi
1/1,
where
(4) AY 
E
0
nY,V pY,V j
/1 dj  0
nY,O pY,Oj
/1 dj
,
and E denotes total spending in the economy. I treat the number
of ﬁrms as a continuum, implying that ﬁrms take AY as given.
Integrated pairs. Consider ﬁrst the problem faced by a
ﬁnal-good producer and its integrated supplier. If the latter pro-
duces a high-quality intermediate input and the ﬁrms agree in
the bargaining, the potential revenues from the sale of the ﬁnal
good are RY(i)  pY(i)y(i). On the other hand, if the parties fail
to agree in the bargaining, the ﬁnal-good producer will only be
able to sell an amount y(i) of output, which using (3) will
translate into sale revenues equal to a fraction 
 of sale revenues
in the case of an agreement. The ex post opportunity cost for the
supplier is zero, implying that the ex post gains from trade are
(1 
)RY(i). Because of the contract incompleteness, the sur-
plus is divided among the parties at t3. Generalized Nash Bar-
gaining leaves the ﬁnal-good division with its default option

RY(i) plus a fraction  of the quasi rents, while the integrated
supplier receives the remaining fraction 1 of the quasi rents.
Since both  and  are assumed to be strictly less than one, the
supplier’s ex post revenues from producing a high-quality input
are strictly positive. Low-quality inputs will therefore never be
produced at t2. Rolling back to t1, the ﬁnal-good producer sets its
investment in capital Kx,Y(i) to maximize   RY(i)  rKx,Y(i),
where
   
  1  
  .
The program yields a best-response capital investment Kx,Y(i)i n
terms of factor prices, the level of demand as captured by AY, and
the investment in labor Lx,Y(i). On the other hand, the integrated
supplier simultaneously sets Lx,Y(i) to maximize (1   )RY(i) 
wLx,Y(i), from which an analogous reaction function for Lx,Y(i)i s
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14 Solving for the intersection of these two best-response
functions and plugging the equilibrium ex ante investments into
(2) and (3), yields the optimal price for all varieties in industry Y:
(5) pY,V 
r
Yw
1Y
  Y1    
1Y .
Facing a constant elasticity of demand, the ﬁnal-good producer
charges a constant markup over marginal cost. The distortionary
effect of incomplete contracting takes the form of a markup that
is 1/  Y(1   )
1Y times higher than the one that would be
charged if contracts were complete.
15
At t0, the supplier makes a lump-sum transfer TY,V to the
ﬁnal-good producer. As discussed above, this ex ante transfer
exactly equals the supplier’s proﬁts, so that ex ante proﬁts for an
integrating ﬁnal-good producer can be expressed as
(6) F,V,Y  1  1  Y   1  2YAYpY,V
/1  fr
Yw
1Y,
where pY,V is given in (5).
Nonintegrated pairs. Consider next a pair of stand-alone
ﬁrms. In this case, the supplier is entitled to the residual rights of
control over the amount of input produced at t2. The ex post
opportunity cost for the ﬁnal-good producer is therefore zero in
this case. As for the supplier, since the component is speciﬁct o
the ﬁnal-good producer, the value of xY(i) outside the relationship
is also zero. It follows that if the intermediate-input producer
hands a component with the correct speciﬁcation, the potential
sale revenues RY(i) will be entirely quasi rents. In the bargain-
ing, the ﬁnal-good producer will obtain a fraction  of these ex
post gains, and at t1 it will choose Kx,Y(i) to maximize RY(i) 
rKx,Y(i). On the other hand, the supplier will set Lx,Y(i)t o
maximize (1  )RY(i)  wLx,Y(i). It is clear that the solution
to the problem is completely analogous to that for pairs of inte-
grated ﬁrms, with  replacing   in equations (5) and (6). In partic-
ular, proﬁts for a ﬁnal-good producer that chooses to outsource the
14. The supplier could in principle ﬁnd it optimal to complement the capital
investment of the ﬁnal-good division with some extra investment of its own.
Nevertheless, if the two investments in capital are perfect substitutes in produc-
tion, Assumption 1 is sufﬁcient to ensure that the optimal capital investment of
the supplier is zero (see Antra `s [2003]).
15. At t1 the two parties also choose how much capital and labor to rent in
incurring the ﬁxed costs. The particular values of these factor demands can be
obtained by applying Shepard’s lemma (e.g., Lf,F,Y  (1  Y) fF(w/r)
Y).
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(7) F,Y,O  1  1  Y  1  2YAYpY,O
/1  fr
Yw
1Y,
where pY,O  r
Yw
1Y/(
Y(1  )
1Y).
It is useful to compare the present setup to one in which the
quality of the component was veriﬁable, so that quality-contin-
gent contracts could be enforced. In such a case, the two parties
would bargain over the division of the surplus upon entry, and the
contract would not be renegotiated ex post. The investments in
capital and labor would be set to maximize the total surplus of the
relationship, which is given by pY(i)y(i)  rKx,Y(i)  wLx,Y(i) 
fr
Yw
1Y. It is straightforward to check that the impossibility of
writing enforceable contracts leads to underinvestment in both
Kx,Y and Lx,Y. Underinvestment stems from the fact that, with
incomplete contracts, producers receive only a fraction of the
marginal return to their ex ante investments. The inefﬁciency is
depicted in Figure IV. The curves F* and S* represent the reac-
tion functions K* x,Y(Lx,Y) and L* x,Y(Kx,Y) under complete con-
tracts, with the corresponding equilibrium in point A. Similarly,
B and C depict the incomplete-contract equilibria corresponding
to integration and outsourcing, respectively. Crucially, the under-
investment in labor relative to that in capital tends to be greater
FIGURE IV
Complete Versus Incomplete Contracts
1389 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREunder integration that under outsourcing.
16 This follows from the
fact that under integration, the supplier has a relatively weaker
bargaining power and thus receives a smaller fraction of the
marginal return to its ex ante investment. By a similar argument,
the investment in capital tends to be relatively more inefﬁcient
under outsourcing than under integration.
II.C. Factor Intensity and Ownership Structure
At t0, the ﬁnal-good producer chooses the ownership struc-
ture that maximizes its ex ante proﬁts. Let (k) denote the ratio
of operating proﬁts under vertical integration to those under
outsourcing. Using equations (6), (7), and   
  (1 
), this
ratio can be expressed as
(8) k 1 
1  
1  2k
1  1  k  1  2k
1 


1  

k/1
1  

/1.
As I prove in Appendix 2, the attractiveness of integration, as
measured by (k), is increasing in the capital intensity of in-
termediate input production; i.e., (k) 
 0. Intuitively, the
relatively higher underinvestment in capital associated with out-
sourcing is more value-reducing, the higher the capital intensity
in production. Furthermore, it can be shown that for low enough
capital intensities, outsourcing yields higher proﬁts than integra-
tion ((0)  1), while for high enough capital intensities, the
converse is true ((1) 
 1).
17 It thus follows:
PROPOSITION 1. There exists a unique threshold capital intensity
 ˆ  (0,1) such that all ﬁrms with k  ˆ choose to outsource
production of the intermediate input (i.e., (k)  1), while
16. By this I mean that (L* x,Y/Lx,Y,V)/(K* x,Y/Kx,Y,V) 
 (L* x,Y/Lx,Y,O)/(K* x,Y/
Kx,Y,O). Note that this also implies that controlling for industry characteristics,
integrated suppliers should be using a higher capital-labor ratio in production
than nonintegrated ones. This is consistent with the results of some empirical
studies, discussed in Caves [1996, pp. 230–231] and Dunning [1993, p. 296], that
compare capital intensity in overseas subsidiaries of multinational ﬁrms with that
of independent domestic ﬁrms in the host country.
17. An important point to notice here is that (k) is not a function of factor
prices. This follows directly from the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology and
isolates the partial-equilibrium decision to integrate or outsource from any po-
tential general-equilibrium feedbacks. This implied block-recursiveness is a use-
ful property for solving the model sequentially, but the main results should be
robust to more general speciﬁcations for technology.
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 ˆ choose to integrate their suppliers (i.e.,
(k) 
 1). Only ﬁrms with capital intensity  ˆ are indiffer-
ent between these two options.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
The logic of this result lies at the heart of Grossman and
Hart’s [1986] seminal contribution. In a world of incomplete con-
tracts, ex ante efﬁciency dictates that residual rights should be
controlled by the party undertaking a relatively more important
investment. If production of the intermediate input requires
mostly labor, the investment made by the ﬁnal-good producer will
be relatively small, and thus it will be optimal to assign the
residual rights of control to the supplier in order to alleviate the
underinvestment in the labor input (see Figure IV). Conversely,
when the capital investment is important, the ﬁnal-good producer
will optimally choose to tilt the bargaining power in its favor
by obtaining these residual rights, thus giving rise to vertical
integration.
18
Proposition 1 advances a rationale for the ﬁrst fact identiﬁed
in the introduction. To the extent that vertical integration of
suppliers occurs mostly in capital-intensive industries, one would
expect the share of intraﬁrm trade to be relatively higher in those
industries. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 cannot by itself justify the
trade pattern in Figure I. An explanation of this fact requires a
proper modeling of international trade ﬂows, which I carry out in
Section III.
II.D. Industry Equilibrium
Without loss of generality, consider next the industry equi-
librium in sector Y. In equilibrium, free entry implies that no ﬁrm
makes positive expected proﬁts. In principle, three equilibrium
modes of organization are possible: (i) a mixed equilibrium with
some varieties being produced by integrated pairs and others by
nonintegrated pairs; (ii) an equilibrium with pervasive integra-
18. Equation (8) lends itself to other comparative static exercises. For in-
stance, it is possible to show that (k) is a decreasing function of , which by the
implicit function theorem implies that the cutoff  ˆ is an increasing function of .
To understand this result, notice that an increase in  shifts bargaining power
from the supplier to the ﬁnal-good producer regardless of ownership structure
(since   increases with ). It thus follows that increasing  necessarily worsens
the incentives for the supplier. To compensate for this, the ﬁnal-good producer will
now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to outsource in a larger measure of capital intensities. The
partial derivative of (k) with respect to  and  is in general ambiguous (see
Antra `s [2003] for details).
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source the production of the intermediate input; and (iii) an
equilibrium with pervasive outsourcing in which no ﬁnal-good
producer chooses to vertically integrate its supplier. The assump-
tion that all ﬁrms in a given industry share the same capital
intensity greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. In particular, a mixed
equilibrium in industry Y can only exist in a knife-edge case,
namely when Y  ˆ. The equilibrium in industry Y is either one
with pervasive integration when Y 
 ˆ, or one with pervasive
outsourcing when Y  ˆ.
Because a mixed equilibrium does not generically exist, we
can focus on a characterization of the two other types of equilib-
ria. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium in which only integrating ﬁnal-
good producers enter the market. As discussed above, the ex ante
transfer TY,V ensures that suppliers always break even. If no
ﬁnal-good producer outsources the production of xY, all ﬁrms will
charge a price for y(i) given by equation (5). Since nY,O  0,
equation (4) simpliﬁes to AY,V  EpY,V
/(1)/nY,V. Plugging this
expression into equation (6) and setting F,V to 0 as dictated by
free entry, yields the following expression for the equilibrium
number of vertically integrated pairs:
(9) nY,V 
1  1  Y    1  2Y
fr
Yw
1Y E.
Naturally, the equilibrium number of varieties in industry Y
depends positively on total spending in the industry and nega-
tively on ﬁxed costs.
Consider next an equilibrium with pervasive outsourcing. In
such an equilibrium every ﬁrm charges a price given by pY,O
which makes equation (4) simplify to AY,O  EpY,O
/(1)/nY,O.
Imposing again free entry on equation (7) yields the equilibrium
number of pairs undertaking outsourcing,
(10) nY,O 
1  1  Y  1  2Y
fr
Yw
1Y E.
II.E. General Equilibrium
Having described the equilibrium in a particular industry,
we can now move to the general equilibrium of the closed econ-
omy, in which income equals spending:
(11) E  rK  wL,
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focus on the equilibrium in the labor market. Letting LY and LZ
denote total labor demand by each pair in industries Y and Z,
labor market clearing requires nYLY  nZLZ  L. We can
decompose LY into three components, depending on the equilib-
rium mode of organization. In an equilibrium with pervasive
integration,
(12) LY  Lx,Y,V  Lf,F,Y  Lf,S,Y.
The ﬁrst term is the total amount of labor hired by integrated
suppliers for the manufacturing of intermediate inputs. The re-
maining terms are the amounts of labor hired to cover ﬁxed costs
by ﬁnal-good producers and suppliers. Plugging the equilibrium
values for labor demands into equation (12), and using (11) and
the equilibrium value of nY,V to simplify, results in
(13) wnY,VLY  1  Y1  Y2   1rK  wL.
Similarly, in an equilibrium with pervasive outsourcing,
(14) wnY,OLY  1  Y1  Y2  1rK  wL.
Equations (13) and (14) imply that the share of income that
labor receives is sensitive to the equilibrium mode of organiza-
tion. Given the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology, in a
world of complete contracts, the share of income accruing to labor
in industry Y would be (1  Y). With incomplete contracts, the
share received by labor will be larger or smaller than (1  Y)
depending on whether  or   are smaller or greater than 1⁄2.
To set the stage for an analysis of the share of intraﬁrm trade
in total trade, I make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 2. Y 
 ˆ 
 Z.
In words, I assume that the equilibrium in industry Y is one
with pervasive integration, while that in industry Z is one of
pervasive outsourcing. It is useful to deﬁne the shares of income
that accrue to capital in each sector, which using equations (13)
and (14) are given by Y ˜  Y(1  (1  Y)(2   1)) and Z ˜ 
Z(1  (1  Z)(21)).
19 Denoting the average labor share
in the economy by L  (1  Y ˜)  (1  )(1  Z ˜) and impos-
19. Notice that Y 
 Z implies that Y ˜  Z ˜ and incomplete contracting
does not create factor intensity reversals.
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rental ratio in the economy can be expressed as
(15)
w
r 
L
1  L
K
L .
Because of the unit elasticity of substitution in production, the
equilibrium wage-rental ratio is a linear function of the aggregate
capital-labor ratio. The factor of proportionality is equal to the
average labor share in the economy divided by the average capital
share. Under Assumption 1 the average labor share and the
equilibrium wage-rental ratio are depressed relative to their val-
ues in a world with complete contracts.
20
III. THE MULTICOUNTRY MODEL:
CAPITAL ABUNDANCE AND INTRAFIRM TRADE
Suppose now that the closed economy described above is split
into J  2 countries, with each country receiving an endowment
K
j of capital and an endowment L
j of labor. Factors of production
are internationally immobile. Countries differ only in their factor
endowments. In particular, individuals in all J countries have
identical preferences as speciﬁed in equation (1) and share access
to the same technology in equation (2). The parameters  and 
are also assumed to be identical everywhere. Countries are al-
lowed to trade intermediate inputs at zero cost, while ﬁnal goods
are instead assumed to be nontradable, so that each ﬁnal-good
producer has a (costless) plant in each of the J countries.
21 Va-
rieties of intermediate inputs will instead be produced in only one
location in order to exploit economies of scale. I assume that for
all j  J, the capital-labor ratio K
j/L
j is not too different from
K/L, so that factor price equalization (FPE) holds, and the equi-
librium prices and aggregate allocations are those of the inte-
grated economy described above. Below, I derive both necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions for FPE to be achieved.
20. Intuitively, with 
1⁄2 , the underinvestment in labor is relatively more
severe than the underinvestment in capital. Because factors are supplied inelas-
tically, the relatively lower demand for labor tends to push down its price and its
share in total income.
21. Because ﬁnal goods are costlessly produced, the model cannot en-
dogenously pin down where their production is located. Assuming that they are
not traded resolves this indeterminacy. In Antra `s [2003] I showed that the main
result goes through under alternative setups that equally resolve the indetermi-
nacy (see footnote 27 for more on this).
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location of production of intermediate inputs and show how the
cross-country differences in factor endowments naturally give
rise to cross-country differences in industry structure. I then
analyze the implied patterns of international trade and discuss
the determinants of its intraﬁrm component.
III.A. Pattern of Production
Because countries differ only in their factor endowments, the
cutoff capital intensity  ˆ will be identical in all countries, and by
Assumption 2, suppliers in industry Y will be vertically inte-
grated while those in industry Z will remain nonintegrated. The
factor market clearing conditions in country j  J can be written
as
(16) nY
j Kx,Y
j  Kf,F,Y
j  Kf,S,Y
j   nZ
j Kx,Z
j  Kf,F,Z
j  Kf,S,Z
j   K
j
(17) nY
j Lx,Y
j  Lf,F,Y
j  Lf,S,Y
j   nZ
j Lx,Z
j  Lf,F,Z
j  Lf,S,Z
j   L
j,
where nk
j refers now to the number of industry k varieties of
intermediate inputs produced in country j.
22 It is straightforward
to check that factor demands for each variety depend only on
worldwide identical parameters and on aggregate prices, which
because of FPE are also common in all countries. This implies
that differences in the pattern of production between countries
will be channelled through the number of industry varieties pro-
duced in each country. Plugging the equilibrium factor demands
into (16) and (17) and combining these two expressions yields the
number of varieties of intermediate inputs produced in country j:
(18) nY
j 1  Z ˜ 1  L
K
j
K  Z ˜L
L
j
L
nY
Y ˜  Z ˜ 
(19) nZ
j Y ˜L
L
j
L  1  Y ˜1  L
K
j
K
nZ
Y ˜  Z ˜1  
,
where nY is given by equation (9) and nZ by equation (10) with Z
replacing Y. Equation (18) states that a given country j  J will
produce a larger measure of intermediate-input varieties in in-
dustry Y, the larger its capital-labor ratio. Conversely, from equa-
22. To simplify notation, I drop all subscripts associated with the equilibrium
mode of organization. For instance, I denote the equilibrium number of varieties
produced in industry Y (Z) and country j by nY
j (nZ
j ) instead of nY,V
j (nZ,O
j ).
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decreasing function of its capital-labor ratio. Note also that for a
given K
j/L
j both nY
j and nZ
j are increasing in the size of country j,
as measured by its share in world GDP, sj  (rK
j  wL
j)/(rK 
wL). In fact, it is easy to check that nY
j 
 s
jnY if and only if
K
j/L
j 
 K/L, and nZ
j 
 s
jnZ if and only if K
j/L
j  K/L. In words,
capital- (labor)-abundant countries tend to capture a fraction of
the world production of input varieties in the capital (labor)-
intensive industry that exceeds their share in world income.
For the above allocation to be consistent with FPE, it is
necessary and sufﬁcient that nY
j 
 0 and nZ
j 
 0 for all j  J, i.e.,
that no country fully specializes in any one sector.
23 Using equa-
tions (18) and (19), this condition can be written as
ASSUMPTION 3.
  
Y ˜L
1  Y ˜1  L

K
j/L
j
K/L 
Z ˜L
1  Z ˜1  L
  for all j  J.
24
Figure V provides a graphical representation of the produc-
tion pattern for the case of two countries, the North (N) and the
South (S). The graph should be familiar to readers of Helpman
and Krugman [1985]. O
N and O
S represent the origins for the
North and the South, respectively. The vectors O
NY and O
NZ
represent world employment of capital and labor in industries Y
and Z in the equilibrium of the integrated economy. The set of
factor endowments consistent with FPE corresponds to the set of
points inside the parallelogram O
NYO
SZ. Point E deﬁnes the
distribution of factor endowments. Line BB goes through point E
and has a slope of w/r. The relative income of each country is thus
held ﬁxed for all points along this line and inside the FPE set. To
map this ﬁgure to the pattern of production described above, I
follow Helpman and Krugman [1985] in choosing units of mea-
surement so that O
NY  nYy, O
NZ  nZz, and O
NO
S 
E  rK  wL. With the ﬁrst two normalizations, we can graphi-
23. To understand necessity, notice that when factor prices depend only on
world factor endowments, the capital-labor ratio in production is ﬁxed and iden-
tical for all countries. Therefore, a given country cannot employ all its factors by
producing in only one industry except in the knife-edge case in which its endow-
ment of K
j and L
j exactly match that industry’s factor intensity. For a discussion
of sufﬁciency see Helpman and Krugman [1985, pp. 13–14].
24. The upper bound   is greater than one, while the lower bound  is smaller
than one. Assumption 3 thus requires the capital-labor ratio K
j/L
j to be sufﬁ-
ciently similar to K/L.
1396 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScally determine the number of varieties of intermediate inputs
produced in each country. Moreover, with the last normalization
we can write s
N  O
NC/O
NO
S. Basic geometry then implies
that nY
N 
 s
NnY and nZ
N  s
NnZ, which is what we expected given
that, in the graph, the North is capital-abundant relative to the
South.
So far, I have assumed that factors of production are inter-
nationally immobile. I therefore have not allowed ﬁnal-good pro-
ducers to rent the capital stock in their home country and export
it to the country where intermediates are produced. Allowing for
such international factor movements would not invalidate the
equilibrium described above. In fact, by equalizing factor prices
everywhere, international trade in intermediate inputs elimi-
nates the incentives for capital to ﬂow across countries.
25
25. More generally, I only require that the costs of capital mobility are higher
than the costs of trading goods, so that international differences in rates of return
are arbitraged away through trade ﬂows rather than through capital ﬂows (cf.
Mundell [1957]).
FIGURE V
Pattern of Production for J  2
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Having described the international location of production of
intermediate inputs, we can ﬁnally move to the study of trade
patterns. Since the ﬁnal good is nontradable, the entire volume of
world trade will be in intermediate inputs. Before describing
these ﬂows in more detail, we must ﬁrst confront the problem of
how to value them. The fact that contracts are incomplete implies
that there is no explicit price for these varieties. Because all
variable costs are incurred in the country where the input is
produced, a plausible assumption is to value these intermediates
at average cost. And because the ﬁnal good is produced at no cost,
the implicit price of an intermediate input is simply pY,V in
industry Y and pZ,O in industry Z.
26
Without loss of generality, consider now a given country N’s
imports from another country S. Country N will host nY  nZ
plants producing ﬁnal-good varieties. Of the nY plants in industry
Y, a measure nY
S will be importing the intermediate input from
their integrated suppliers in country S. This volume of trade will
thus be intraﬁrm trade. On the other hand, of the nZ plants in
industry Z, a measure nZ
S will be importing the input from inde-
pendent suppliers in country j  N. These transactions will thus
occur at arm’s length. Furthermore, because preferences are ho-
mothetic and identical everywhere, consumers in country N will
incur a fraction s
N of world spending on each variety. It thus
follows that the total volume of N imports from S will be
s
N(nY
SpYy  nZ
SpZz), or simply
(20) M
N,S  s
Ns
SrK  wL.
Similarly, the total volume of country N exports to country S is
s
Ss
N(rK  wL), implying that trade is balanced. Since both
industries produce differentiated goods, for a given s
N  s
S, the
volume of bilateral trade is maximized when both countries are of
equal size (cf. Helpman and Krugman [1985]).
Consider next the composition of imports. Because only in
industry Y will intermediate inputs ﬂow within ﬁrm boundaries,
the volume of country N intraﬁrm imports from S is given by
26. As suggested by a referee, intermediates could alternatively be valued
according to the supplier’s average revenues. In such case, the implicit prices
would be (1   )pY,V and (1  )pZ,O. This would reduce the value of trade
ﬂows, with a disproportionate reduction in industry Y. As a result, the link
between factor endowments and the volume of trade established in Proposition 2
below would be attenuated.
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N,S  s
NnY
SpYy. Plugging the equilibrium value for nY
S and
rearranging, it is possible to express intraﬁrm imports as
(21) Mif
N,S  s
Ns
SrK  wL
1  Z ˜1  LK
S/L
S  Z ˜LK/L
Y ˜  Z ˜1  LK
S/L
S  LK/L
.
Intraﬁrm imports are increasing in the size of both the importing
and exporting countries and, from simple differentiation of (21),
are also increasing in the capital-labor ratio of the exporting
country.
LEMMA 1. For any pair of countries N, S  J with S  N, the
volume of N’s intraﬁrm imports from S, Mif
N,S, is, for a given
size s
N of the importing country, an increasing function of the
capital-labor ratio K
S/L
S and the size s
S of the exporting
country. Furthermore, for a given K
S/L
S and s
S, Sif
N,S is also
increasing in the size s
N of the importing country.
Figure VI depicts combinations of factor endowments that
yield the same volume of intraﬁrm imports Mif
N,S, for the case in
FIGURE VI
Volume of Intraﬁrm Imports
1399 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREwhich there are only two countries, N and S. The arrows in the
graph point in the direction of increasing intraﬁrm imports. Point
C is such that O
NC  CO
S, implying that the line BB
contains all points for which s
N  s
S. The graph shows how for a
given capital-labor ratio of the exporting South, Mif
N,S is maxi-
mized when the two countries are of equal size. On the other
hand, for a given relative size of the two countries, Mif
N,S is
increasing in the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
Next, let Sif
N,S denote the share of intraﬁrm imports in total
imports; i.e., Sif
N,S  Mif
N,S/M
N,S. Dividing equation (21) by (20)
yields
(22) Sif
N,S 
1  Z ˜1  LK
S/L
S  Z ˜LK/L
Y ˜  Z ˜1  LK
S/L
S  LK/L
.
Notice that Assumption 3 ensures that Sif
N,S  (0,1). When
K
S/L
S goes to   K/L, the South only produces varieties of
intermediates in industry Z, and thus Sif
N,S goes to 0. Similarly,
when K
S/L
S goes to    K/L, the South fully specializes in indus-
try Y, and thus Sif
N,S goes to 1. Furthermore, simple differentia-
tion of (22) reveals the following.
PROPOSITION 2. For any pair of countries N, S  J with S  N,
the share Sif
N,S of intraﬁrm imports in total N’s imports from
S is an increasing function of the capital-labor ratio K
S/L
S of
the exporting country. Furthermore, for a given K
S/L
S, Sif
N,S
is unaffected by the relative size of each country.
The ﬁrst statement is one of the key results of the paper. In
a world of international trade and specialization, the pattern of
Figure II in the Introduction is a direct implication of the pattern
in Figure I. Figure VII provides a graphical illustration of Propo-
sition 2 for the case of two countries. Since Sif
N,S is uniquely
determined by K
S/L
S, the sets of points for which Sif
N,S is constant
are simple straight lines from the origin of the South. The arrows
indicate that for any relative size of each country, Sif
N,S is increas-
ing in K
S/L
S.
27
27. In Antra `s [2003], I study the robustness of the results to alternative
assumptions on the tradability of ﬁnal goods. For example, I consider the case of
a probabilistic location of ﬁnal-good production. Final-good varieties can be
traded, but each variety is produced in only one randomly chosen location. If the
probability that a given ﬁnal-good variety is produced in a certain country is
proportional to the size of the country, but is independent of the speciﬁc variety,
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In this section I use data on intraﬁrm and total U. S. imports
to test more formally the empirical validity of the main results of
the paper. I ﬁrst study the relationship between factor intensity
and the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports, and show that
the clear correlation in Figure I is not driven by other omitted
variables. Next, I move on to the relationship between relative
factor endowments and the share of intraﬁrm imports. The link
predicted by Proposition 2 is conﬁrmed even when controlling for
other factors that could reasonably be expected to affect this
share. Finally, I analyze the determinants of the total volume of
intraﬁrm imports and show that, consistently with Lemma 1,
its industry, and the location of intermediate-input production, the share of
intraﬁrm imports is again given by equation (22) up to a constant factor of
proportionality.
FIGURE VII
Share of Intraﬁrm Imports
1401 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREtotal intraﬁrm imports are signiﬁcantly affected by both the capi-
tal-labor ratio and the size of the exporting country.
IV.A. Speciﬁcation
The ﬁrst hypothesis to test is that the share of intraﬁrm
imports is higher, the higher the capital intensity of the exporting
industry. The model presented above actually has the stark pre-
diction that the share should be 0 for industries with capital
intensity k below a certain threshold  ˆ and 1 for industries with
k 
 ˆ. As I illustrate in Antra `s [2003], however, if the statisti-
cian disaggregates the data into M industries following a crite-
rion different from the one dictated by preferences or technology,
the model can be shown to predict a smooth positive association
between the recorded share of intraﬁrm imports in a given indus-
try and the recorded average capital intensity in the industry.
28
In the econometric results below, I report estimates from regres-
sions of the form,
(23) ln Sif
US,ROWm  1  2 ln K/Lm  W m3  m,
where (Sif
US,ROW)m is industry m’s share of intraﬁrm imports in
total U. S. imports from the rest of the world, (K/L)m is the
average capital-labor ratio in the industry, Wm is a vector of
controls, and m is an orthogonal error term. The vector Wm is
included to control for other possible industry-speciﬁc determi-
nants of the integration decision. Since I observe the share
(Sif)m in four different years, I also include industry effects in
the regressions below. In light of Proposition 1, I hypothesize that
2 
 0.
The second hypothesis that I test is that, in the cross section
of countries, the share of intraﬁrm imports in total imports is
higher, the higher the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country.
Equation (22) actually provides a closed-form solution for this
relationship. Denoting the importing country by US and the
exporting country by j, and applying a log-linear approximation
to (22) leads to the following speciﬁcation:
29
28. As pointed out by a referee, the smooth pattern in Figure I could also be
the result of idiosyncratic preferences by ﬁrms concerning the outsourcing deci-
sion. An explicit modeling of such ﬁrm-level heterogeneity would, however,
greatly complicate the general-equilibrium analysis.
29. In particular, I log-linearize (22) around K
j/L
j  K/L, and obtain
ln Sif
US, jKj/LjK/L  ln  
1  LL
1  L  Z ˜ln
K
j
L
j  ln
K
L.
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US, j  1  2 ln K
j/L
j  3 ln L
j  W j4  j,
where Sif
US,j is the share of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S.
imports from country j, K
j/L
j is the capital-labor ratio of country
j, L
j is population in country j, Wj is a vector of controls, and j is
an orthogonal error term. The theory predicts that 2 should be
positive. In fact, from the log-linearization, we can derive a much
more precise prediction; i.e., 2  1  LL/1  L  Z ˜.
This implies that the elasticity of the share of intraﬁrm imports to
the capital-labor ratio should not be lower than the labor share in
the economy. Furthermore, from the last statement in Proposi-
tion 2, we should not expect 3 to be signiﬁcantly different from
zero.
The third test I conduct consists of running a regression
analogous to (24) but with the log of total intraﬁrm imports
(instead of its share in total imports) on the left-hand side. In
particular, I consider the speciﬁcation,
(25) ln Mif
US, j  1  2 ln K
j/L
j  3 ln L
j  W j4  j.
In view of Lemma 1, both 2 and 3 should be positive. Further-
more, it is easy to show that the model imposes the restrictions
2 
 2 and 3  1.
30 In words, the total volume of intraﬁrm
imports should be more responsive to the capital-labor ratio of the
exporting country than its share in total imports, while its elas-
ticity with respect to the size of the exporting country should be
one.
IV.B. Data
The left-hand-side variables are constructed combining data
on intraﬁrm U. S. imports and overall U. S. imports. Intraﬁrm
U. S. imports include (i) imports shipped by overseas afﬁliates to
their U. S. parents, and (ii) imports shipped to U. S. afﬁliates by
their foreign parent group. The series were obtained from the
direct investment data set available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) website. For reasons discussed in Appendix 3, I
am restricted to running equation (23) for a panel consisting of 23
manufacturing industries and four years of data: 1987, 1989,
1992, and 1994. As for equations (24) and (25), data availability
limits the analysis to a cross section of 28 countries in 1992 (see
30. A log-linear approximation of equation (21) around K
j/L
j  K/L yields
2  (1  L)(1 Z ˜)/(1  L  Z ˜) 
 2 and 3  1. See Antra `s [2003] for details.
1403 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREAppendixes 4 and 5 for a complete list of industries and coun-
tries). In the panel of industries the share of intraﬁrm imports in
total U. S. imports ranges from a value slightly below 1 percent
for textiles in 1987 to around 82 percent for drugs in 1994, for an
overall average of 21.2 percent. In the cross section of countries
the share ranges from an almost negligible 0.1 percent for Egypt
up to 64.1 percent for Switzerland, for an overall average of 22.4
percent (see Table II).
Most right-hand-side variables in the cross-industry regres-
sions are taken from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Produc-
tivity Database.
31 Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of
the total capital stock to total employment in the corresponding
exporting industry.
32 To control for other potential determinants
of internalization, I run equation (23) including other industry
characteristics one at a time. First, I allow for the possibility that
the integration decision might be determined by the human-
31. The SIC classiﬁcation used in the NBER Manufacturing Database was
converted to BEA industry categories using a concordance table available from the
BEA and is reproduced in Appendix 4.
32. This presupposes that U. S. industry capital intensities are similar to
those in the rest of the world. In a world with factor price equalization, this would
naturally be the case. In a more general setup, the much weaker assumption of no
factor intensity reversals is sufﬁcient to ensure that the same qualitative results
would be obtained by using factor intensity data from the exporting country.
TABLE II
SHARE OF INTRAFIRM IMPORTS IN TOTAL U. S. IMPORTS (PERCENT)
by Industry (avg. 1987–1994) by Country (1992)
DRU 65.5 FOO 13.9 CHE 64.1 ESP 15.5
OCH 40.9 PAP 12.7 SGP 55.4 AUS 15.5
VEH 39.8 FME 12.6 IRL 53.7 JPN 14.2
ELE 37.3 STO 11.8 CAN 45.1 ISR 12.4
COM 36.7 INS 11.1 NDL 42.2 HKG 11.2
CHE 35.9 TRA 10.7 MEX 41.7 PHL 8.4
CLE 35.7 PLA 9.1 PAN 35.8 ITA 8.1
RUB 23.9 PRI 6.1 GBR 33.2 ARG 5.1
AUD 23.8 LUM 4.1 DEU 31.9 COL 4.6
OEL 18.9 OMA 2.6 MYS 30.1 OAN 4.6
IMA 17.3 TEX 2.3 BEL 27.3 VEN 1.4
BEV 15.1 BRA 25.9 CHL 1.3
FRA 21.6 IDN 1.3
SWE 16.8 EGY 0.1
See Appendixes 4 and 5 for a list of industries and countries.
1404 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScapital intensity of the production process. To the extent that
ﬁnal-good producers also contribute to their suppliers’ costs re-
lated to the acquisition of human capital (e.g., by ﬁnancing train-
ing programs), a model along the lines of the one developed above
would indeed predict an effect of human-capital intensity. I mea-
sure human-capital intensity as the ratio of nonproduction work-
ers to production workers in a given industry, as reported in the
NBER Manufacturing data set. A similar argument could be used
to defend the inclusion of some measure of the importance of R&D
and advertising in the production process. R&D intensity and
advertising intensity are deﬁned, respectively, as the ratio of
R&D expenditures to sales and advertising expenditures to sales,
and are obtained from a 1977 FTC survey.
33 I also control for the
possibility that the integration decision may be driven by the size
of scale economies at the plant level, as measured by average
capital stock per establishment.
34 Finally, the decision to inte-
grate could also be related to the importance of suppliers’ produc-
tion in the overall value chain. A rough way of proxying for this is
to control for the share of value added in total industry sales,
again from the NBER manufacturing data set.
The main right-hand-side variables in equations (24) and
(25), including the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country and
its total population, are taken from the cross section of country
variables for the year 1988 constructed by Hall and Jones [1999].
In the present paper I have adopted the view that capital abun-
dance is a crucial determinant of the amount of multinational
activity in a given country. Zhang and Markusen [2001] develop
a model in which the volume of foreign direct investment in a
given country is instead crucially affected by its skilled-labor
abundance. To control for these possible effects, I include the
measure of human capital abundance reported in Hall and Jones
[1999]. Other authors have stressed the importance of ﬁscal and
institutional factors in determining the attractiveness of foreign
direct investment in a given country. Countries with relatively
lower corporate taxes and relatively better institutional environ-
ments should, in principle, be more prone to hosting afﬁliates of
U. S. ﬁrms. In the regressions below, I use data on average
33. This measure has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Cohen and
Klepper [1992], and Brainard [1997]).
34. This variable was constructed combining the capital stock ﬁgures from
the NBER data set with data on the number of establishments published by the
U. S. Census Bureau in its County Business Patterns series.
1405 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREcorporate tax rates from a Price Waterhouse survey, as well as
the index of institutional quality for the year 1990 reported in
Gwartney et al. [2002]. Within the institutional factors, I also
attempt to distinguish between the effect of a country’s degree of
openness to FDI and that of its degree of openness to interna-
tional trade. Indices of openness to FDI and to trade are obtained
from survey data reported in the World Competitiveness Report
[1992]. Table III reports descriptive statistics for all variables
included in the regressions.
IV.C. Results
The top panel of Table IV presents random effects estimates
of equation (23). Column I includes no controls in the regression
and is therefore the econometric analog to Figure I. The coefﬁ-
cient on ln (K/L)m is positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero
at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level. The estimated elasticity of the
share of intraﬁrm imports with respect to the capital-labor ratio
in production implies that a 1 percent increase in K/L increases
the share of intraﬁrm imports by around 0.95 percent. Column II
includes human-capital intensity in the regression. This leads to
a reduction of the estimate of 2 which, however, remains highly
signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on ln (H/L)m is positive but not sta-
TABLE III
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Obs Mean St. dev. Min Max
ln (Sif
US,ROW)m 92 1.90 0.92 4.74 0.19
ln (K/L)m 92 4.26 0.57 3.21 5.73
ln (H/L)m 92 0.69 0.60 1.78 0.60
ln (R&D/Sales)m 92 4.20 1.00 6.07 2.47
ln (ADV/Sales)m 92 4.27 1.10 6.63 2.24
ln (Scale)m 92 1.63 0.92 0.06 3.48
ln (VAD/Sales)m 92 0.66 0.18 1.13 0.32
ln (Sif
US,j)2 8 2.08 1.44 6.67 0.45
ln (K/L)j 28 10.54 0.86 8.13 11.59
ln (L)j 28 16.03 1.20 13.63 18.16
ln (H/L)j 28 0.82 0.19 0.47 1.10
CorpTaxj 28 0.32 0.08 0.15 0.44
EconFreedomj 28 6.36 1.22 4.19 8.24
OpFDI 26 7.83 1.23 4.73 9.57
OpTrade 26 6.70 1.22 3.52 8.67
ln (Mif
US,j) 28 6.36 2.64 1.39 10.49
1406 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStistically signiﬁcant. In column III the ratio of R&D expenditures
to sales is also included in the regression and is found to have a
very signiﬁcant effect on the share of intraﬁrm imports. The
estimate of 2 in column III is lower than that implied by Figure
I, but it still implies that a 1 percent increase in K/L, should lead
to a 0.78 percent increase in the share of intraﬁrm imports. The
inclusions of advertising intensity in column IV, of the size of
economies of scale in column V, and of value-added intensity in
column VI, do not overturn any of the qualitative results. None of
these variables seems to affect signiﬁcantly the share of intraﬁrm
imports, while capital intensity and R&D intensity remain sig-
niﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Consistency of the random effects estimates requires the
industry effects to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory
variables. One might worry that the omission of some relevant
industry variables might lead to biases in the random effects
TABLE IV
FACTOR INTENSITY AND THE SHARE Sif
US,ROW
Dep. var. is
ln (Sif
US,ROW)m
Random effects regressions
I II III IV V VI
ln (K/L)m 0.947*** 0.861*** 0.780*** 0.776*** 0.703*** 0.723***
(0.187) (0.190) (0.160) (0.162) (0.249) (0.253)
ln (H/L)m 0.369 0.002 0.038 0.037 0.081
(0.213) (0.188) (0.200) (0.206) (0.221)
ln (R&D/Sales)m 0.451*** 0.470*** 0.452*** 0.421***
(0.107) (0.114) (0.128) (0.140)
ln (ADV/Sales)m 0.055 0.059 0.035
(0.094) (0.097) (0.107)
ln (Scale)m 0.068 0.100
(0.179) (0.190)
ln (VAD/Sales)m 0.403
(0.657)
R
2 0.50 0.55 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73
No. of obs. 92 92 92 92 92 92
Fixed effects regressions
I II III IV V VI
ln (K/L)m 0.599** 0.610** 0.610** 0.610** 0.943** 1.058**
(0.299) (0.300) (0.300) (0.300) (0.412) (0.410)
p-value
Wu-Hausman
test 0.14 0.27 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses (*, **, and, ***) are 10, 5, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
1407 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREestimates. As a robustness check, the bottom panel of Table IV
reports the ﬁxed effects estimates of 2 together with the p-value
of a Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of the industry effects.
35
The ﬁxed effects estimates of 2 are all signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. Furthermore, the point
estimates are not too different from their random effects counter-
parts, and the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the industry effects
cannot be rejected at reasonable signiﬁcance levels.
Table V reports OLS estimates of equation (24) for the cross
section of 28 countries. The estimates in column I correspond to
the simple correlation depicted in Figure II. The elasticity of the
share of intraﬁrm imports with respect to the capital-labor ratio
of the exporting country is signiﬁcantly different from zero, and
as predicted by the theory, the point estimate of the elasticity is
necessarily higher than any plausible labor share in the world.
Column II conﬁrms the claim in Proposition 2 that, for a given
K
j/L
j, the size of the exporting country should not affect the share
Sif
US,j. The coefﬁcient of ln (L)j is actually negative but statisti-
35. The R&D and advertising intensity variables are purely cross-sectional
and are thus dropped in the estimation. This explains that the estimates in
columns II, III, and IV are all identical.
TABLE V
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND THE SHARE Sif
US,j
Dep. var. is
ln (Sif
US,j) I II III IV V VI
ln (K/L)j 1.141*** 1.110*** 1.244*** 1.239*** 1.097** 1.119**
(0.289) (0.299) (0.427) (0.415) (0.501) (0.399)
ln (L)j 0.133 0.159 0.158 0.142 0.017
(0.168) (0.164) (0.167) (0.170) (0.220)
ln (H/L)j 1.024 0.890 1.273 0.822
(1.647) (1.491) (1.367) (1.389)
CorpTaxj 0.601 0.068 1.856
(3.158) (3.823) (2.932)
EconFreedomj 0.214
(0.213)
OpFDIj 0.384*
(0.218)
OpTradej 0.292
(0.273)
R
2 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.43
No. of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*, **, and, ***) are 10, 5, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
1408 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScally indistinguishable from zero. Column III introduces the mea-
sure of human-capital abundance in the regression. Contrary to
what might have been expected (cf. Zhang and Markusen [2001]),
the estimated coefﬁcient on ln (H/L)j is negative, although again
insigniﬁcantly different from zero. Conversely, the effect of physi-
cal-capital abundance remains signiﬁcantly positive at the 1 per-
cent level. As shown in column IV and V, controlling for the
average corporate tax rate and the index of institutional quality
does not overturn the results. The coefﬁcients on both CorpTaxj
and on EconFreedomj are not signiﬁcantly different from zero,
while the estimate of 2 remains signiﬁcantly positive at the 5
percent level. Finally, column VI suggests that the insigniﬁcance
of the institutional variable in column V might be due to the
counterbalancing effects of different policies. In particular, the
share of intraﬁrm trade is negatively affected by the degree of
openness to FDI but positively (although insigniﬁcantly) affected
by the degree of openness to trade.
36 Overall, the signiﬁcant effect
of the capital-labor ratio of the exporting country on the share of
intraﬁrm imports appears to be very robust.
Table VI presents the OLS estimates of equation (25). Col-
umns I and II conﬁrm that the theoretical predictions in Lemma
1 are borne out by the data. Both the capital-labor ratio of the
exporting country and its size seem to have a signiﬁcant positive
effect on the volume of U. S. intraﬁrm imports. Consistently with
the theory, the elasticity of Mif
US,j with respect to K
j/L
j is esti-
mated to be higher than the elasticity of Sif
US,j with respect to
K
j/L
j. Furthermore, the elasticity of Mif
US,j with respect to L
j is,
as predicted, not signiﬁcantly different from one. As reported in
columns III and IV, controlling for human capital abundance and
for the average corporate tax rate has a negligible effect on the
coefﬁcients. The inclusion of the institutional index in column V
leads to a substantial fall in the estimated elasticity of intraﬁrm
imports to the capital-labor ratio, but the effect remains signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level. Finally, column VI includes separate
measures of openness to FDI and openness to trade. The results
indicate that controlling for the capital-labor ratio of the export-
ing country, intraﬁrm imports are negatively affected by its open-
36. Including OpFDI and OpTrade reduces the number of observation to 26,
since no data on these variables are available for Egypt and Panama. I reran the
regressions in columns I through V, without these two countries and obtained very
similar results.
1409 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREness to FDI.
37 More importantly, the effect of the capital-labor
ratio continues to be signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, while the
effect of size is only marginally insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent
level.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper began by unveiling two systematic patterns in the
intraﬁrm component of international trade. Traditional trade
theory is silent on the boundaries of ﬁrms. Existing contributions
to the theory of the ﬁrm tend to be partial-equilibrium in scope
and have ignored the international dimensions of certain in-
traﬁrm transactions. Building on two workhorse models in inter-
national trade and the theory of the ﬁrm, I have developed a
simple model that can account for the novel facts identiﬁed in the
introduction. By combining a Grossman-Hart-Moore view of the
37. This may seem puzzling, but the model can shed light on this ﬁnding.
Recall from footnote 18 that the attractiveness of integration is decreasing in the
share  of ex post surplus accruing to ﬁnal-good producers. If a higher openness
to FDI corresponds to a larger bargaining power for foreign ﬁnal-good producers,
then on this account the model is consistent with the coefﬁcient on OpFDI being
signiﬁcantly negative.
TABLE VI
FACTOR ENDOWMENTS AND THE VOLUME Mif
US, j
Dep. var. is
ln (Mif
US,j) I II III IV V VI
ln (K/L)j 2.048*** 2.192*** 2.188*** 2.154*** 1.650** 2.096***
(0.480) (0.458) (0.716) (0.663) (0.762) (0.695)
ln (L)j 0.607** 0.608** 0.614** 0.670** 0.700
(0.229) (0.268) (0.271) (0.243) (0.419)
ln (H/L)j 0.031 0.953 0.406 0.708
(3.289) (3.316) (2.992) (3.052)
CorpTaxj 4.135 1.763 0.647
(5.294) (5.955) (5.295)
EconFreedomj 0.795
(0.443)
OpFDIj 1.006**
(0.474)
OpTradej 0.674
(0.560)
R
2 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.49
No. of obs. 28 28 28 28 28 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*, **, and, ***) are 10, 5, and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
1410 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSﬁrm with a Helpman-Krugman view of international trade, I
have constructed a model that determines both the pattern of
international trade and the boundaries of ﬁrms in a uniﬁed
framework.
Nevertheless, much remains to be done. Future empirical
investigations are likely to unveil new distinct features of the
volume of intraﬁrm trade that cannot be accounted for by the
simple model developed here. On the one hand, the Grossman-
Hart-Moore theory enhances our understanding of only a subset
of the determinants of ownership structure. Holmstro ¨m and Mil-
grom [1994] have emphasized that, in many situations, issues
related to job design and the cost of measuring performance are
more relevant when choosing between inside or outside procure-
ment. It would be interesting to investigate the implications of
such a view of the ﬁrm for the volume of intraﬁrm trade. On the
other hand, in determining trade patterns, I have resorted to a
very simple trade model. Future work should help us to under-
stand potential channels by which technological differences,
transport costs, or international factor-price differences can affect
the organization and location of international production.
APPENDIX 1: THE RATIONALE FOR COST SHARING
In Appendix 1, I show that Assumption 1 is sufﬁcient to
ensure that ﬁnal-good producers always choose to contribute to
their suppliers’ capital expenditures.
Consider the problem faced by an independent supplier when
the ﬁnal-good producer decides not to contribute to variable costs.
In such a case, the supplier chooses Kx,Y(i) and Lx,Y(i) to maxi-
mize (1  )RY(i)  rKx,Y(i)  wLx,Y(i), and the ﬁnal-good
producer simply receives RY(i) ex post. Following similar steps
as in the main text, it is easy to show that ex ante proﬁts for a
ﬁnal-good producer can now be expressed as
(26)  ˜ F,Y,O    1  1  AY
r
Yw
1Y
1  
/1
 fr
Yw
1Y.
The case of an integrated supplier is completely analogous. In
particular, the same expression (26) applies with   replacing .
Comparing equation (26) with (6) and (7), one can show the
following.
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1⁄2) ﬁnal-good produc-
ers will always decide to bear the cost of renting the capital
required to produce the intermediate input.
Proof. Combining equations (7) and (26), it follows that re-
gardless of the level of demand AY the ﬁnal-good producer in a
pair of stand-alone ﬁrms will decide to incur the capital expendi-
tures itself whenever
1  1  Y  1  2Y

1  
/1
   1  1  ,
which holds whenever 
1⁄2 . To see this, deﬁne the function
H  1  1    1  2

1  
Y/1
   1  1  ,
and notice ﬁrst that H(1/2)  0. Next note that
H  

1  
/1
 1  

1  
/1

1  1    1  2
1  1    2.
The ﬁrst term is clearly positive when 
1⁄2. Furthermore, since
[(1  (1  )   (1  2))]/[(1  )(1  )] increases with ,
it follows that [(1  (1  )   (1  2))]/[(1  )(1  )] 
2  1/((1  ))  2 
 0 and the second term is also positive.
Hence, H() 
 0 for all 
1⁄2. Since   
 , as long as 
1⁄2,
ﬁnal-good producers in integrated pairs will also decide to rent
the capital stock and hand it to the supplier. QED
The intuition for this result is that the higher is , the
smaller is the fraction of the marginal return to its ex ante
investments that the supplier receives, and thus the less it will
invest in Kx,Y. This underinvestment will have a negative effect
on the value of the relationship, which is what the ﬁnal-good
producer maximizes ex ante. For a large enough  (in this case
1⁄2), the detrimental effect of the underinvestment in capital is
large enough so as to make it worthwhile for the ﬁnal-good
producer to bear the cost of renting Kx,Y itself, even if by doing so
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for 
1⁄2 , a supplier incurring all variable costs faces a too
severe holdup problem, which the ﬁnal-good producer ﬁnds opti-
mal to alleviate by sharing part of the required ex ante
investments.
APPENDIX 2: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The ﬁrst step of the proof consists in showing that (k) 

0 for all k  [0,1].
LEMMA 3. The attractiveness of integration, as measured by
(k), increases with the capital intensity of intermediate
input production k: (k) 
 0 for all k  [0,1].
Proof. From simple differentiation of (8), it follows that
(k) 
 0 if and only if
k ln1 


1  
  2  1  1  
,
where (k)  (1  (1   )   k(1  2  ))(1  (1  ) 
k(1  2)) and remember that   
  (1 
). Now notice
that if   
 1⁄2 then (k)  0 @k  [0,1], and if   
1⁄2 , then (k) 
 0 @k  [0,1]. Furthermore, if   
 1⁄2 
 ,
then (k)  0 @k  [0,1]. It thus follows that (k)  min
{(0), (1)}. Without loss of generality, assume that (1)  (1 
)(1  ((1  )
)  (0) (the case (1) 
 (0) is entirely
symmetric). We need to show that () 
 0 for all   (0, 1) where
  ln1 


1  
 
2  1  1  

1  1    1  
.
From simple differentiation of this expression, it follows that
() 
 0 if and only if (1   )
2  (2  )(1  )(1  )
0 for
some   (0,1). But it is simple to check that this is in fact true
for all ,   (0,1), and therefore () 
 (0)  0. Notice that
Assumption 1 is not necessary for this result. QED
Next, notice that from equation (8) and the deﬁnition of  ,w e
can write
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1  1    
1  1  
1   
1  
/1
 1
and 1 
1   
1  
 

/1
 1.
The inequalities follow from   
and the fact that (1  x)
x
/(1) is an increasing function of x for   (0,1) and x  (0,1).
Given Lemma 3, it thus follows that there exists a unique  ˆ  (0,1)
such that (k)  1 for k  ˆ, (k) 
 1 for k 
 ˆ, and (k)  1
for k  ˆ. QED
APPENDIX 3: DATA
Appendix 3 discusses in more detail the construction of the
share of intraﬁrm imports in total U. S. imports. Intraﬁrm im-
ports were obtained from the “Financial and Operating Data” on
multinational ﬁrms downloadable from the BEA website. Since in
the model ownership is associated with control, I restricted the
sample to majority-owned afﬁliates. As discussed in the main
text, the BEA suppresses data cells in order to avoid disclosure of
individual ﬁrm data. The unsuppressed data are only available to
researchers afﬁliated with the BEA. Unfortunately, one of the
requirements for afﬁliation is being a U. S. citizen (which I am not).
To construct intraﬁrm imports by industry, I combine data
from foreign afﬁliates of U. S. ﬁrms and U. S. afﬁliates of foreign
ﬁrms. Intraﬁrm imports comprise (i) imports shipped by overseas
afﬁliates to their U. S. parents, by industry of afﬁliate; and (ii)
imports shipped to U. S. afﬁliates by their foreign parent group,
by industry of afﬁliate.
38 The sum of these two elements was
constructed at the ﬁnest level of disaggregation available, focus-
ing on manufacturing industries and excluding natural-resource
38. The BEA deﬁnes a foreign parent group as consisting of (1) the foreign
parent, (2) any foreign person, proceeding up the foreign parent’s ownership
chain, that owns more than 50 percent of the person below it, up to and including
the ultimate beneﬁcial owner, and (3) any foreign person, proceeding down the
ownership chain(s) of each of these members, that is owned more than 50 percent
by the person above it.
The conceptually correct disaggregation for case (ii) would have been by the
industry of the exporter (i.e., of the foreign parent group). Unfortunately, these
series are not available. Intraﬁrm imports of type (i), however, constitute more
than two-thirds of all intraﬁrm imports. More importantly, a pattern similar to
that in Figure I emerges when the analysis is restricted to intraﬁrm imports of
type (i).
1414 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSindustries (in particular, petroleum, ferrous metals, and nonfer-
rous metals).
39 I also restricted the sample to years in which
benchmark surveys were conducted. Overall, I end up with 23
industries and four years: 1987, 1989, 1992, and 1994.
To construct intraﬁrm imports by country, I add up (i) im-
ports shipped by overseas afﬁliates to their U. S. parents, by
country of origin, and (ii) imports shipped to U. S. afﬁliates by
their foreign parent group, by country of origin. In both cases I
restrict the analysis to manufacturing industries, although in
this case it was impossible to remove those transactions involving
natural resources (this might explain why intraﬁrm imports from
Chile and Venezuela are lower than predicted in Figure II). The
BEA performs two types of manipulations to the data. Apart from
suppressing cells to avoid disclosure of data of individual compa-
nies, it also assigns a unique symbol to trade ﬂows below
$500,000. I assign a value of $250,000 to these cells.
40 Overall, I
end up with a single cross section with 28 countries in 1992. All
the other benchmark survey years lack at least one of the com-
ponents of intraﬁrm imports.
Finally, in order to compute the share of intraﬁrm imports, I
construct total U. S. imports by industry and year, and then by
country of origin, using data put together by Robert Feenstra and
available from the NBER website. Import ﬁgures correspond to
their c.i.f. values. Feenstra’s four-digit industry classiﬁcation was
matched to the 23 BEA industries using a conversion table avail-
able from BEA and reproduced in Appendix 4.
As pointed out by a referee, a signiﬁcant portion of intraﬁrm
trade involves ﬁnal goods that are shipped from a manufacturing
plant to an overseas wholesale afﬁliate which then distributes the
good in the foreign country. Unfortunately, the BEA data set does
not distinguish between imports of intermediate inputs and im-
ports of ﬁnal goods, so that the latter cannot be subtracted from
intraﬁrm imports. As pointed out by the same referee, however,
this is not necessarily a problem for the empirical work as an
analogous theoretical model can also be interpreted in the context
of a supplier-distributor relationship.
39. Patterns of ownership in natural-resource sectors are likely to be deter-
mined by factors such as national sovereignty, from which I abstract in the model.
40. This is only done for two observations. The results are robust to imputing
alternative values between 0 and $500,000.
1415 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTUREAPPENDIX 4: INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION AND CLASSIFICATION
Code Description
Corresponding industry
SIC classiﬁcation
BEV Beverages 208
FOO Other food and kindred products 201–207, 209
CHE Industrial chemicals and synthetics 281, 282, 286
DRU Drugs 283
CLE Soap, cleaners and toilet goods 284
OCH Other chemical products 285, 287, 289
FME Fabricated metal products 341–349
COM Computer and ofﬁce equipment 357
IMA Other industrial machinery and
equipment
351–356, 358, 359
AUD Audio, video, and communications
equipment
365, 366
ELE Electronic components and accessories 367
OEL Other electronic and electrical
machinery
361–364, 369
TEX Textile products and apparel 221–229, 231–39
LUM Lumber, wood, furniture, and ﬁxtures 241–49, 251–59
PAP Paper and allied products 261–263, 265, 267
PRI Printing and publishing 271–279
RUB Rubber products 301, 302, 305, 306
PLA Miscellaneous plastics products 308
STO Stone, clay, and glass products 321–29
VEH Motor vehicles and equipment 371
TRA Other transportation equipment 372–376, 379
INS Instruments and related products 381, 382, 384–387
OMA Other manufacturing 211–19, 311–19, 391–99
APPENDIX 5: COUNTRY CODES
Code Country Code Country
ARG Argentina IDN Indonesia
AUS Australia IRL Ireland
BEL Belgium ISR Israel
BRA Brazil ITA Italy
CAN Canada JPN Japan
CHE Switzerland OAN Taiwan
CHL Chile PAN Panama
COL Colombia PHL Philippines
DEU Germany MEX Mexico
EGY Egypt MYS Malaysia
ESP Spain NDL Netherlands
FRA France SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SWE Sweden
HKG Hong Kong VEN Venezuela
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1416 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSREFERENCES
Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey, “Renegotiation Design
with Unveriﬁable Information,” Econometrica, LXII (1994), 257–282.
Antra `s, Pol, “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” Ph.D. Thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 2003.
Aoki, Masahiko, “Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,” Journal of
Economic Literature, XXVIII (1990), 1–27.
Baker, P. George, and Thomas N. Hubbard, “Make or Buy in Trucking: Asset
Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” American Economic Review, XCIII
(2003), 551–572.
Brainard, S. Lael, “An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration
Trade-off between Multinational Sales and Trade,” American Economic Re-
view, LXXXVII (1997), 520–544.
Casson, Mark, Alternatives to the Multinational Enterprise (London: Macmillan,
1979).
Caves, Richard E., Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Second
Edition, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Donald B. Hausch, “Cooperative Investments and the Value
of Contracting,” American Economic Review, LXXXIX (1999), 125–147.
Coase, Ronald H., “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, IV (1937), 386–405.
Cohen, Wesley M., and Steven Klepper, “The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity
Distributions,” American Economic Review, LXXXII (1992), 773–799.
Dunning, John H., Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, (Cam-
bridge, UK: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1993).
Ethier, Wilfred J., “The Multinational Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CI
(1986), 805–833.
Ethier, Wilfred J., and James R. Markusen, “Multinational Firms, Technology
Diffusion and Trade,” Journal of International Economics, XLI (1996), 1–28.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart, “The Costs and Beneﬁts of Ownership:
A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy,
XCIV (1986), 691–719.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman, “Integration versus Outsourcing in
Industry Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII (2002a), 85–
120.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman, “Outsourcing in a Global Economy,”
NBER Working Paper No. 8728, 2002b.
Gwartney, James D., with Chris Edwards, Robert Lawson, Walter Park, and
Veronique De Rugy, Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report
(Vancouver, Canada: Fraser Institute, 2002).
Hall, Robert E., and Charles I. Jones, “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much
More Output per Worker than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXIV (1999), 83–116.
Hart, Oliver, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1995).
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,”
Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII (1990), 1119–1158.
Helpman, Elhanan, “A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational
Corporations,” Journal of Political Economy, XCII (1984), 451–471.
Helpman, Elhanan, and Paul R. Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).
Holmstro ¨m, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom, “The Firm as an Incentive System,”
American Economic Review, LXXXIV (1994), 972–991.
McLaren, John, “Globalization and Vertical Structure,” American Economic Re-
view, XC (2000), 1239–1254.
Markusen, James R., “Multinationals, Multi-Plant Economies, and the Gains
from Trade,” Journal of International Economics, XVI (1984), 205–226.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts, “Johnson Controls, Inc., Automotive Systems
Group: The Georgetown, Kentucky Plant,” Stanford Graduate School of Busi-
ness Case S-BE-9, 1993.
Mundell, Robert A. “International Trade and Factor Mobility,” American Eco-
nomic Review, XLVII (1957), 321–335.
No ¨ldeke, Georg, and Klaus M. Schmidt, “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A
1417 FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND TRADE STRUCTURESolution to the Hold-up Problem,” RAND Journal of Economics, XXVI (1995),
163–179.
Romalis, John, “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade,”
mimeo Chicago Graduate School of Business, 2002.
Rugman, Alan M., Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
Tirole, Jean, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1988).
UNCTAD, World Investment Report: Promoting Linkages (New York: United
Nations, 2001).
Whinston, Michael D., “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Inte-
gration,” mimeo, Northwestern University, 2002.
Williamson, Oliver E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, NY:
Free Press, 1985).
World Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum and International Insti-
tute for Management Development, 1992.
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics (Geneva: 2001).
Young, S., N. Hood, and J. Hamill, “Decision-Making in Foreign Owned Multina-
tional Subsidiaries in the U. K.,” ILO Working Paper No. 35, Geneva, Inter-
national Labor Ofﬁce, 1985.
Zeile, William J., “U. S. Intraﬁrm Trade in Goods,” Survey of Current Business,
LXXVII (1997), 23–38.
Zhang, Kevin H., and James R. Markusen, “Vertical Multinationals and Host-
Country Characteristics,” Journal of Development Economics, LIX (2001),
233–252.
1418 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS